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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world in which a parochial school teacher can be fired 
for reporting the sexual abuse of a child to the government. Now 
imagine that teacher cannot seek legal recourse because a so-called 
“ministerial exception” immunizes religious employers against 
lawsuits brought by their employees. Depending on how the Supreme 
Court rules in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,1 that 
hypothetical world could become ours. 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court will consider the 
applicability of antidiscrimination laws to religious organizations. 
More precisely, the Court will consider whether the ministerial 
exception bars parochial school teachers from filing 
antidiscrimination suits against their religious employers, even when 
their teaching duties are not functionally different from those of lay 
employees. Hosanna-Tabor thus implicates a complicated and 
conflicting set of constitutional interests. On the one hand, teachers 
have a constitutional right to be free from invidious discrimination. 
On the other, parochial schools have a right to the free exercise of 
their religion. Furthermore, Congress and the courts must work 
together to balance these interests while avoiding excessive 
government entanglement with religion. 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 10-
553). 
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This commentary will examine Hosanna-Tabor in all its 
complexity. After providing the factual and legal background, 
addressing the appellate court’s decision, and examining the 
arguments before the Supreme Court, the commentary will return to 
the previously posed hypothetical. This commentary will then 
conclude that, fortunately for parochial school teachers, such a 
hypothetical world is, at least for now, probably only hypothetical. 
   II. FACTS 
Cheryl Perich, the respondent in the case at hand, began working 
for the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School 
(Hosanna-Tabor) in 1999.2 As a contract teacher,3 she taught a full 
range of academic subjects, including math, science, gym, language 
arts, social studies, art, and music.4 She also taught a religion class four 
days a week, led her students in prayer three times a day, and led 
chapel services approximately twice a year on a rotating basis with 
the other teachers.5 In total, Perich spent about forty-five minutes per 
day on religious activities.6 
In March of 2000, the Hosanna-Tabor church congregation 
approved Perich to be a “called” teacher.7 As a called teacher, she 
enjoyed open-ended employment, for-cause termination rights, and 
the title of “commissioned minister.”8 Though being called did require 
approval from the congregation and some additional religious 
education, her actual duties remained the same.9 
Four years later, Perich was hospitalized after becoming ill during 
a summer church event.10 Hosanna-Tabor recommended that she take 
disability leave for the upcoming academic year, reassuring her that 
 
 2.  Id. at 772. 
 3.  Contract teachers at Hosanna-Tabor are lay teachers hired by the school board for 
one-year renewable terms. Id. Notably, Hosanna-Tabor did not require that its teachers be 
Lutheran. Id. at 773. In fact, non-Lutheran teachers had responsibilities identical to Lutheran 
teachers, and Hosanna-Tabor has employed at least one non-Lutheran teacher in the past. Id. 
 4.  See id. at 772 (stating that Perich’s duties as a contract teacher and as a called teacher 
were identical). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. In contrast, those with the title “ordained minister” worked in the pastoral office 
and had the power to “preach the Word and administer the Sacraments.” Brief for Respondent 
Cheryl Perich at 4–5, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3380507, at *4–5. 
 10.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 597 F.3d at 773. 
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her job would still be there when she returned to good health.11 After 
nearly five months on disability leave, however, the school changed its 
tune. When Perich informed the school of her intention to return to 
work in February, the school principal expressed doubt that Perich 
would be healthy enough to return by then, despite assurances to the 
contrary from Perich’s doctor.12 Contemporaneously, the principal 
informed Perich that the school board intended to amend the school 
handbook, requesting that employees on more than six months 
disability leave resign their callings.13 The principal also reported to 
the congregation that Perich likely would not be “physically capable” 
of returning to work that year.14 In response, the board requested 
Perich’s “peaceful resignation” in exchange for covering some of her 
medical expenses.15 Perich declined.16 
Controversy erupted on February 22, 2005, the day Perich’s doctor 
stated she could safely return to work.17 Perich arrived at the school 
ready to resume teaching, but the school had no position available for 
her.18 Perich feared that if she did not return to work the first day she 
was eligible, the school would construe a provision in the employee 
handbook to claim that she voluntarily terminated her employment.19 
Accordingly, she refused to leave until the administration provided 
written acknowledgement of her presence that day.20 Instead, the 
administration wrote her a letter stating that she provided improper 
notice of her return and asking her to remain on disability leave until 
it could develop a plan to accommodate her.21 When the school 
contacted Perich later that evening to suggest that she probably 
would be fired for her “disruptive behavior earlier that day,” Perich 
stated that she would resort to legal means to protect herself if they 
could not come to an agreement.22 
On March 19, the school sent Perich a letter stating that due to her 
“insubordination and disruptive behavior,” the board would request 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 774. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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that the congregation rescind her calling at its next voter’s meeting.23 
The letter also asserted that Perich’s “threat[] to take legal action” 
had “damaged, beyond repair” her relationship with Hosanna-Tabor.24 
On March 21, Perich’s counsel informed Hosanna-Tabor that its 
actions constituted illegal discrimination.25 Shortly thereafter, 
Hosanna-Tabor terminated Perich’s employment.26 In response, 
Perich filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).27 
On September 28, the EEOC filed a complaint in district court 
alleging that Hosanna-Tabor violated the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA). The alleged violation occurred when Hosanna-Tabor 
terminated Perich’s employment in retaliation for her threat to take 
protective legal action against unlawful discrimination.28 Hosanna-
Tabor responded that it terminated Perich’s employment because her 
threat to pursue a legal remedy outside of the church’s internal 
dispute-resolution process contradicted church doctrine.29 Despite this 
claim, Hosanna-Tabor had not mentioned church doctrine or the 
church’s dispute-resolution procedures in any of the letters written 
during the controversy.30 
Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment on the theory that 
the district court had no jurisdiction to hear an employment-
discrimination claim, the resolution of which would require the court 
to rule on matters of church doctrine that are protected by the First 
Amendment.31 The district court agreed and barred Perich’s claim 
under the ministerial exception, primarily because Perich’s official 
title at the time was “commissioned minister.”32 Perich appealed.33 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 775. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See id. at 781 (“Hosanna-Tabor has attempted to reframe the underlying dispute . . . to 
the question of whether Perich violated church doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute 
resolution.”). 
 30.  Id. at 782. 
 31.  See id. at 775, 781 (“[C]ontrary to Hosanna-Tabor’s assertions, Perich’s claim would 
not require the court to analyze any church doctrine.”). 
 32.  See id. (“[T]he district court relied largely on the fact that Hosanna-Tabor gave Perich 
the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world as a minister by bestowing this 
title upon her.”). 
 33.  Id. at 775. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
In general, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating 
against their employees on the basis of disability.34 Its anti-retaliation 
provision forbids employers from retaliating against an employee 
because that employee opposed or brought a claim against unlawful 
practices.35 
The ADA provides two exceptions to its applicability to religious 
organizations. It explicitly allows religious organizations to give 
preference in employment decisions to members of a particular 
religion, and to require all applicants or employees to conform to the 
religious tenets of the organization.36 The ADA’s anti-retaliation 
provision, however, contains no exemptions for religiously motivated 
retaliation.37 Accordingly, it is unclear whether an employer can 
lawfully retaliate against an employee who reports a potential ADA 
violation when the employer provides a religious reason for 
termination. 
B. Ministerial Exception 
At common law, courts also have provided protections for 
religious organizations. The ministerial exception exempts religious 
organizations from the application of antidiscrimination laws when 
that application might violate the principles of the First Amendment, 
such as the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.38 The 
exception ensures that antidiscrimination laws do not force religious 
organizations to make employment decisions that might contradict 
the tenets of their faith.39 For example, the ministerial exception 
would prevent antidiscrimination laws from forcing the Catholic 
Church to hire female priests.40 
 
 34.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2011) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . .”). 
 35.  § 12203(a). 
 36.  § 12113(d). 
 37.  See § 12203(a) (failing to mention religious motive as an exception). 
 38.  Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 39.  See id. at 304–07 (“The ministerial exception, as we conceive of it, operates to bar any 
claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right to select who will 
perform particular spiritual functions.”). 
 40.  Cf. id. at 307–08 (applying the ministerial exception to bar a female university 
chaplain’s gender discrimination claim). 
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This exception is actually a specific application of the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine,41 which provides that courts should 
interpret statutes so that their application will not risk violating 
constitutional principles.42 Thus, the ministerial exception is an 
interpretive tool that courts use to limit the construction of statutes 
like the ADA in order to avoid potential conflict with the First 
Amendment.43 In practice, that means courts will invoke the 
ministerial exception to bar lawsuits that risk violating First 
Amendment principles, even if after a more careful examination, the 
lawsuit would not actually violate the First Amendment.44 
Every circuit to have considered the issue has decided that, at the 
very least, applying antidiscrimination laws to the minister-church 
relationship would violate or risk violating the First Amendment.45 
But courts also agree that the ministerial exception should not apply 
to the lay employees of religious organizations because regulating 
those employees does not raise the same entanglement or free 
exercise concerns.46 The question is: where do courts draw the line 
between ministers and lay employees?47 
 
 
 41.  See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ministers 
exception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule . . . .”). 
 42.  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the 
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
 43.  See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the 
ministerial exception to avoid the risk of constitutional conflict between the First Amendment 
and an antidiscrimination statute). 
 44.  See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 
(1979) (“Accordingly, in the absence of a clear expression of Congress’ intent to bring teachers 
in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act 
in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions 
arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”). 
 45.  Petruska, 462 F.3d at 303–04 (“Every one of our sister circuits to consider the issue has 
concluded that application of Title VII to a minister-church relationship would violate—or 
would risk violating the First Amendment and, accordingly, has recognized some version of the 
ministerial exception.” (citing McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61; Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165–67 (4th Cir. 1985); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed 
Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
 46.  See, e.g., Soriano v. Xavier Univ. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1988) 
(holding that an age-discrimination suit did not raise free exercise or establishment clause 
issues); Grotke v. Canisius High Sch., No. 90-CV-1057S, 1992 WL 535400, at *1, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 11, 1992) (allowing suit by a lay teacher at a parochial school). 
 47.  See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(referencing a case that the court believes falls “just across the [ministerial versus lay] line . . . ”). 
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In answering this question, most circuits have adopted a 
functionalist approach that examines the duties of the employee.48 For 
example, one test asks whether the “primary duties consist of 
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a 
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and 
worship.”49 Stated differently, the test asks whether the employee’s 
position is “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the 
church.”50 If it is, then the ministerial exception will apply. Even 
utilizing similar functionalist approaches, circuit courts have reached 
different results. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
ministerial exception applied to a choir director but not to a piano 
tuner.51 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the faculty and staff of a 
religious college were not ministers because they were not 
“intermediaries between a church and its congregation,” did not 
“attend to the religious needs of the faithful,” and did not “instruct 
students in the whole of religious doctrine.”52 According to that circuit, 
faculty and staff are not ministers under the ministerial exception 
simply by being “exemplars of practicing Christians.”53 
Even if a court finds that an employee’s duties are not primarily 
religious and do not bar the lawsuit outright, it must still take care to 
avoid judicial inquiry that could violate the First Amendment. The 
most common pitfall occurs when a religious employer offers a 
religious reason for the employment decision.54 The Supreme Court 
 
 48.  See The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties 
Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1779 (2008) (“Nearly all circuits have adopted the Fourth 
Circuit’s articulation of the primary duties test.”). 
 49.  Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the 
Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1514, 1545 (1979)). 
 50.  Id. at 1168–69 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Sw. Baptist Seminary, 651 
F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 51.  See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040–41 (affirming the dismissal of an age-discrimination suit 
brought by a choir director). 
 52.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 53.  Id.; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 
1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that teachers at a religious school were not ministers, even 
though the school considered its teachers part of its ministry); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that teachers and nuns teaching at a 
church-operated school were not ministers under the ministerial exception because they 
“perform[ed] no sacerdotal functions” and did not “serve as church governors,” even though 
they did teach biblical subject matter as part of the academic curriculum). 
 54.  See, e.g., Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040–41 (“Tomic would argue that the church’s criticism of 
his musical choices was a pretext for firing him, that the real reason was his age. The church 
would rebut with evidence of what the liturgically proper music is for an Easter Mass and Tomic 
might in turn dispute the church’s claim. The court would be asked to resolve a theological 
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has held that it is improper for courts to question the “truthfulness or 
validity of religious beliefs.”55 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,56 
however, the Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting scheme 
that allows courts to ferret out the real reason for a termination 
without examining the wisdom of the proffered reason itself.57 At least 
two circuits, and arguably three, have held this test can be applied to a 
religious organization’s employment decision without violating the 
First Amendment.58 
IV. APPELLATE COURT HOLDING 
The Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision to bar the suit 
under the ministerial exception and remanded with instructions to 
rule on the merits of the retaliation claim.59 The court accepted the 
trial judge’s factual findings, but disagreed with the judge’s legal 
conclusion that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the 
ministerial exception.60 The Sixth Circuit concluded that because 
Perich’s duties were identical to her duties as a lay teacher, and lay 
teachers at Hosanna-Tabor were not even required to be Lutheran, 
she was not a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.61 
Further evidence convinced the concurring judges that the ministerial 
 
dispute.”). 
 55.  DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Emp’t Div., 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990)). 
 56.  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 57.  Id. at 802; DeMarco, 4. F.3d at 170 (“Under the rule of McDonnell Douglas, when an 
employee establishes a prima facie discrimination claim, the burden shifts to the employer to 
proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. If the 
employer contends that its action was motivated by a reason other than age, the burden of 
production then shifts back to the employee to prove that the articulated purpose is mere 
pretext for discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 58.  See DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170–72 (holding that applying the McDonnell Douglas test to 
an employment-discrimination case between a parochial school teacher and the parochial school 
would not raise serious First Amendment concerns); Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary 
Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that courts can “determine whether the 
religious reason stated by [the school] actually motivated the dismissal” without violating the 
First Amendment); Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041 (barring judicial inquiry into a church’s 
employment decision after distinguishing the facts in that case from those in DeMarco). But see 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (denying the 
National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, no matter how 
religious or secular their duties, because of “the critical and unique role of the teacher in 
fulfilling the [religious] mission of a church-operated school”). 
 59.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011). 
 60.  Id. at 780–81. 
 61.  Id. 
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exception should not apply to this case: “[T]he school itself did not 
envision its teachers as religious leaders, or as occupying ‘ministerial’ 
roles.”62 
After determining that the ministerial exception did not apply, the 
court remanded the case to the district court to answer three main 
questions. First, was Perich disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA?63 Second, did Perich oppose a practice that was unlawful under 
the ADA?64 And third, did Hosanna-Tabor violate the ADA in its 
treatment of Perich?65 The court stated that the First Amendment 
would not prevent the trial court from inquiring into “whether a 
doctrinal basis actually motivated Hosanna-Tabor’s actions” because 
“Perich’s claim would not require the court to analyze any church 
doctrine.”66 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner Hosanna-Tabor’s Arguments 
Hosanna-Tabor argues that the ministerial exception bars Perich’s 
claim for a variety of reasons. First, Hosanna-Tabor frames the 
ministerial exception more expansively than the Sixth Circuit by 
maintaining that the exception applies to discrimination suits brought 
by employees who “perform important religious functions,” rather 
than only those employees whose primary duties are religious in 
nature.67 The church views the Sixth Circuit’s application of the 
primary duties test and corresponding analysis as “mechanistic,” 
unable to account for “the concept of an ecclesiastical office,” and 
“not serv[ing] the purpose[] of the ministerial exception.”68 
Next, Hosanna-Tabor argues that Perich performed the kind of 
important religious functions that merit the application of the 
ministerial exception.69 Perich taught religion classes, led worship and 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 781. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 782. 
 66.  Id. at 781–82 (citing DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170–71 (2d Cir. 
1993) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme to inquire into the actual reason 
for a religious employee’s termination without questioning the wisdom or reasonableness of the 
proffered reason for that termination)). 
 67.  Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Jun. 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2414707, at *2. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
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prayer, held ecclesiastical office as a minister, and was “the primary 
instrument for communicating the faith to her students.”70 
Finally, Hosanna-Tabor claims that a failure to apply the 
ministerial exception to this case would result in excessive 
government entanglement with religion for three reasons.71 First, 
Hosanna-Tabor rearticulates its proffered reason for firing her, stating 
that she “violated church teaching” by filing a civil action instead of 
making use of the church’s internal dispute-resolution system.72 
Second, Hosanna-Tabor emphasizes that it was the church 
congregation who found her “unfit for ministry” and chose to 
terminate her.73 Finally, Hosanna-Tabor reasons that allowing the 
claim to proceed on the merits would necessarily involve courts in 
religious questions better left for the church to decide.74 The church 
fears that permitting the claim to proceed could result in an order to 
employ a teacher whose disruptive behavior makes her unfit to teach 
its students about Lutheran doctrine.75 Such state action, it argues, is 
particularly offensive to the First Amendment.76 
B. Respondent Perich’s Arguments 
In response, Perich argues that neither the ministerial exception 
nor the First Amendment should bar her claim. She raises three main 
arguments. First, she emphasizes the government’s compelling interest 
in ending invidious discrimination in employment.77 This not only 
frames the debate as a battle of competing interests rather than 
absolute rights, but reminds the Court that a decision barring Perich’s 
claim will have the effect of permitting the kind of invidious 
discrimination that Congress has sought to eliminate. 
Second, Perich argues that the First Amendment does not prevent 
the application of generally applicable and religiously neutral 
antidiscrimination laws to the facts of this case.78 Perich examines, one 
by one, the Establishment Clause,79 the Free Exercise Clause,80 and the 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 2–3. 
 77.  Brief for Respondent Cheryl Perich, supra note 9, at 17. 
 78.  Id. at 20–22. 
 79.  Id. at 49–57. 
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right of expressive association.81 She argues that not one of these 
important First Amendment principles is at risk of abrogation in 
discrimination suits when the employee in question has functions 
equivalent to a lay person.82 If the First Amendment is not at risk of 
violation, then the ministerial exception need not and should not 
apply.83 
Third, Perich directly attacks Hosanna-Tabor’s definition of the 
ministerial exception.84 According to Perich, if the ministerial 
exception applied to bar claims from any employee who, according to 
the church, served “important religious functions,” then many 
teachers, administrative staff, and social workers would be “without 
the protection from discrimination and retaliation that Congress 
intended to afford them.”85 Furthermore, antidiscrimination laws are 
not the only laws that would be “unearthed,” according to Perich.86 
Anti-retaliation provisions in a variety of neutral and generally 
applicable laws, varying from minimum wage to health and safety 
regulations, would be rendered powerless over religious 
organizations.87 As Perich states, “a religious organization . . . has no 
constitutional entitlement to become a law unto itself.”88 
C. Federal Respondent’s Arguments in Support of Perich 
Speaking for the EEOC, the United States wrote a brief in 
support of Perich, making four main arguments. First, the United 
States claims that Congress fully intended the anti-retaliation 
provision of the ADA to apply to all employers, including religious 
employers.89 Second, it states that the only real question is whether 
the anti-retaliation provision would be unconstitutional as applied to 
the facts of this case.90 According to the United States, because the 
First Amendment would not bar a claim on these facts, the anti-
 
 80.  Id. at 42–48. 
 81.  Id. at 28–41. 
 82.  Id. at 20–22. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 19–20. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 20. 
 89.  Brief for the Federal Respondent at 10–11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-533 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 
WL 3319555, at *10. 
 90.  Id. at 11. 
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retaliation provision applies.91 Third, the United States argues that 
excepting religious organizations from the anti-retaliation provision 
would severely undermine many religiously neutral, generally 
applicable laws and is simply not demanded by any part of the 
Constitution.92 It concludes that constitutional questions arising from 
litigation between religious employers and their employees is “best 
resolved on a case-by-case basis” rather than through the “adoption 
of the petitioner’s overly broad prophylactic rule” that is “contrary to 
this Court’s normal method of as-applied constitutional decision-
making.”93 
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT 
At oral argument, the Court appeared to have differences of 
opinion over two main questions.94 First, what is an appropriate way to 
determine who is and who is not a minister for the purposes of the 
ministerial exception? Second, could a court inquire into the real 
reasons for termination without risking violation of the First 
Amendment? 
With regard to the first issue, Justices Scalia95 and Alito96 seemed 
ready to give great deference to the church’s own determination of 
who is and who is not a minister. Chief Justice Roberts, however, 
appeared to question that idea, wondering how that test would work 
with a church that claimed all of its members were ministers of the 
faith.97 Other Justices, such as Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, 
pressed Hosanna-Tabor’s counsel for a definition of minister and 
hinted that the correct test probably is one that looks to the 
employee’s duties rather than the employee’s official title.98 
With regard to the second issue, Justice Alito seemed ready to 
conclude that it was impossible to perform any such inquiry without 
 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 14. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. 
v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2011). 
 95.  See id. at 10 (Scalia, J.) (“I think your point is that it’s—it’s none of the business of the 
government to decide what the substantial interest of the church is.”). 
 96.  See id. at 15 (Alito, J.) (“But I thought with a lot of deference to the church’s 
understanding of whether someone is a minister?”). 
 97.  See id. at 13 (Roberts, C.J.) (“Every one of our adherents stands as a witness to our 
beliefs. And that—you know, not every church is hierarchical in 20 terms of different offices.”). 
 98.  See id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J.) (“So, the commission is irrelevant. It’s—it’s her job duties 
that count.”). 
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courts questioning church doctrine.99 Justice Breyer, alternatively, 
suggested a more limited, statutory-based holding whereby the Court 
would order the district court to determine whether the ADA’s 
religious conformity exception applies to this case.100 Justice Ginsburg 
seemed to agree and questioned why the doctrinal rule against filing 
civil lawsuits for discrimination was not in the employee handbook.101 
Even Justice Scalia seemed initially confused when counsel for 
Hosanna-Tabor suggested a court would be permitted to consider 
whether the title of minister was a “sham,” but not whether the 
proffered reason for termination was mere pretext.102 Considering that 
Justices Kennedy,103 Ginsburg,104 and Sotomayor105 appeared dismissive 
of the idea that Perich be prevented her day in court over a question 
of jurisdiction, Justice Breyer’s suggestion may predict the Court’s 
disposition. 
VII. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
A. Analysis 
The issue before the Court is whether the ministerial exception 
applies to bar Perich’s antidiscrimination suit against Hosanna-Tabor. 
Because the ministerial exception is an application of the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine, the first question is whether the 
application of the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision to the facts of this 
case raises a serious risk of violating the First Amendment. If there is 
no serious risk of violating the First Amendment, then there is no 
need to apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine and, therefore, no 
need to apply the ministerial exception. No ministerial exception 
 
 99.  See id. at 51 (Alito, J.) (“I still don’t see how the—the approach that the Solicitor 
General is recognizing—is recommending could—can eliminate the problems involved in 
pretext.”). 
 100.  Id. at 18–19. 
 101.  See id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J.) (“But the handbook doesn’t tell her, if you complain to the 
EEOC about discrimination, then you will be fired.”). 
 102.  See id. at 12 (Scalia, J.) (“Is a sham different from a pretext?”). 
 103.  See, e.g., id. at 9 (Kennedy, J.) (“But you’re asking for an exemption so these issues 
can’t even be tried.”). 
 104.  See, e.g., id. at 23 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Mr. Laycock, you, in order, I think, to dispel the 
notion that nothing is permitted, in your reply brief you say there are many suits that could be 
brought that would not be inappropriate. . . . But I don’t understand how those would work if 
the policy is you’re a minister; if you have quarrels with the church or a co-worker, we have our 
own dispute resolution, and you don’t go outside.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J.) (“Under your theory, nothing survives if the 
individual is a minister, no claim, private claim.”). 
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means that Perich’s claim should be permitted to proceed on the 
merits, just as the Sixth Circuit ordered. 
Under traditional appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis, 
Perich’s claim probably should not raise serious First Amendment 
concerns because Perich’s employment fails both the primary duties 
test and the important religious duties test endorsed by Hosanna-
Tabor in its own brief. Indeed, her primary duties both as a contract 
teacher and a called teacher were to teach secular subjects. The Sixth 
Circuit may have been mechanistic to tabulate the exact proportion of 
the day dedicated to secular activities, but Hosanna-Tabor does not 
dispute that the actual time spent on the secular activities far 
exceeded the time spent on religious ones. Even the Seventh Circuit, 
the defender of the “hands off approach,” has recognized that the 
First Amendment did not bar an employment-discrimination suit by a 
math teacher who had “minor religious duties” that included “leading 
the students in prayers and taking them to mass.”106 With regard to the 
important religious duties test, no matter how many times Hosanna-
Tabor reiterates that Perich had some religious duties—and no matter 
how important it considers those duties—it fails to distinguish 
Perich’s duties from those of its lay teachers. The argument that 
Perich is a minister because she had important religious duties is not 
convincing when, in fact, she had identical duties to lay teachers who 
were not required to be Lutheran. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may have created a categorical 
rule barring courts jurisdiction over employment disputes involving 
parochial school teachers.107 In National Labor Relations Board v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,108 the Court used the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine to deny the National Labor Relations Board 
jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, regardless of how religious 
or secular their duties, because “[T]he church-teacher relationship in a 
church-operated school differs from the employment relationship in a 
public or other nonreligious school.”109 Though Catholic Bishop was 
not an antidiscrimination case, such a sweeping rationale would 
 
 106.  Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (analyzing the 
holding of DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993), which did not perform a 
ministerial-exception analysis specifically, but nonetheless performed a constitutional-avoidance 
analysis). 
 107.  See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
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suggest that serious First Amendment questions are raised in an 
employment-discrimination case concerning any parochial school 
teacher, regardless of other facts. Furthermore, Catholic Bishop 
suggested that mere “inquiry into the good faith of the position 
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the 
school’s religious mission” would be enough to raise serious First 
Amendment questions.110 That Hosanna-Tabor claims it fired Perich 
for religious reasons would therefore raise even more concerns in the 
eyes of the Catholic Bishop Court. And if inquiry itself raises 
concerns, then applying the McDonnell Douglas scheme to determine 
the actual reason for the termination may itself be barred by the 
ministerial exception. As such, there is little doubt that under Catholic 
Bishop, the facts of Hosanna-Tabor do raise serious First Amendment 
concerns. 
Because the Catholic Bishop rationale and the traditional 
appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis conflict, it is unclear 
whether allowing Perich’s claim to proceed on the merits would raise 
a serious First Amendment concern. On the one hand, the broad 
language of the Catholic Bishop decision suggests that Perich’s 
discrimination suit against Hosanna-Tabor, a parochial school, 
categorically raises serious First Amendment concerns. On the other, 
Catholic Bishop was decided more than thirty years ago and more 
recent appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis suggests that the 
ministerial exception should not apply because Perich does not 
qualify as a minister.111 
Assuming then, arguendo, that allowing Perich’s claim to proceed 
does raise serious First Amendment concerns, the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine requires the Court to construe the ADA in a way 
that avoids conflict with the First Amendment, unless such a 
construction is plainly contrary to Congress’s intent. The second 
question then becomes whether Congress expressed a clear intention 
 
 110.  Id. at 502. But see DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170–71 (2d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Catholic 
Bishop on the basis that antidiscrimination actions “do not require [the same kind of] extensive 
or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion” into church matters that the National Labor 
Relations Board does). 
 111.  See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 
1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that teachers at a religious school were not ministers, even though 
the school considered its teachers part of its ministry); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 
F.2d 1389, 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that teachers and nuns teaching at a church-
operated school were not ministers under the ministerial exception because they “perform[ed] 
no sacerdotal functions” and did not “serve as church governors,” even though they did teach 
biblical subject matter as part of the academic curriculum). 
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to apply the statute at issue to facts like these. Here, it is undisputed 
that Congress intended the ADA as a whole to apply to religious 
organizations. It is not clear, however, that Congress intended the 
statute to apply to scenarios like this one, where strong facts indicate 
that the employer’s stated reason for terminating employment is 
merely a cover for what was really discrimination on the basis of 
disability. 
The ADA exempts religious organizations from its application in 
only two ways: (1) religious organizations may give preference to 
members of their own religion in hiring decisions, and (2) they may 
require employees to conform with the tenets of the organization’s 
faith.112 As previously discussed, it is unclear whether Congress 
intended these two exceptions to apply to the anti-retaliation 
provision. By arguing that Perich was fired because her threat to 
pursue a legal remedy contradicted Lutheran doctrine, Hosanna-
Tabor can make a colorable argument that the statute contemplates 
and indeed permits such action under the conformity exception. 
Without any clear expression by Congress that the conformity 
exception does not apply to the anti-retaliation provision, the Court 
could bar Perich’s claim and avoid confronting the underlying First 
Amendment conflict that would arise if it allowed her claim to 
proceed. 
But there is one crippling problem with applying the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine at this point in the analysis: the real 
reason for firing Perich is in dispute and has not yet been subject to a 
finding by a trial court. Whether Perich was terminated because she 
was disabled or because she failed to abide by Lutheran doctrine is 
critical to determining whether Congress intended the ADA to apply 
here. If Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich because she failed to abide by 
Lutheran doctrine, then Hosanna-Tabor may terminate Perich under 
the religious conformity exception to the ADA. If, however, Hosanna-
Tabor’s stated religious justification for the termination is merely a 
cover for what was really invidious discrimination on the basis of 
disability, then the religious conformity exception does not apply. The 
Court would have no choice but to allow Perich’s claim and to 
confront the underlying First Amendment conflict. Accordingly, a 
factual dispute must first be resolved before any court can evaluate 
whether Congress clearly intended the ADA to apply to facts like 
 
 112.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(a), 12113(d), 12203(a) (West 2011). 
FINALIZED TURNER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  11:36 AM 
2011] IT’S MY CHURCH AND I CAN RETALIATE IF I WANT TO 37 
these, even if it intended the ADA to apply to religious organizations 
in general. A prudent action would be to remand, instructing the trial 
court to apply the McDonnell Douglas test to determine the actual 
reason Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich. Once that fact has been 
established, the trial court can finish the constitutional-avoidance 
analysis and decide whether the ministerial exception bars Perich’s 
claim. 
B. Likely Disposition 
The Supreme Court is likely to affirm the holding of the appellate 
court. Affirming would allow the Supreme Court to avoid confronting 
the underlying constitutional question. As Justice Breyer stated at 
oral argument, Congress foresaw this difficult question arising 
whenever the ADA was applied to religious organizations and it 
therefore provided a religious conformity exception to the ADA’s 
general applicability. On remand, if the trial court finds that the 
exception applies, then Perich’s suit would be barred without the 
Supreme Court ever addressing the underlying constitutional 
question. If the trial court finds the exception does not apply, the 
Supreme Court need not grant certiorari again unless it wants to 
make a ruling on the ministerial exception or the constitutional 
question. Upholding the Sixth Circuit’s decision would also leave 
intact the traditional appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis 
that the majority of Justices at oral argument seemed to support. 
Affirmation, therefore, would represent something less than a 
monumental shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, something consistent 
with what some would describe as a minimalist court.113 
To be sure, affirming the Sixth Circuit would not be 
uncontroversial. Upholding the decision would send the matter back 
to the district court to inquire into the actual reason Hosanna-Tabor 
fired Perich—without, of course, questioning the wisdom or 
reasonableness of church doctrine. This, in effect, would hold that 
judicial inquiry into the motives behind religious organizations’ 
employment decisions to determine whether the ministerial exception 
applies does not by itself raise serious First Amendment questions. 
Such a holding is supported by at least two circuits,114 but would 
 
 113.  Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 
2, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-supreme-court/. 
 114.  See cases cited supra note 58. 
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depart from the language in Catholic Bishop, which suggests that such 
judicial inquiry would raise serious First Amendment concerns. 
Accordingly, it likely would draw a dissent from the conservative 
Justices, who at oral argument expressed disfavor for pretextual 
inquiries.115 
Reversal, however, would mean the majority of the Court believes 
Perich’s claim should be barred, either by application of the 
ministerial exception or because allowing Perich’s claim to proceed 
would actually violate the First Amendment. If oral argument is any 
indication, the Court does not seem to be leaning in this direction. 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kennedy expressed disapproval at 
the suggestion that Perich’s claims should not be heard.116 
Furthermore, reversal would require the Court either to formulate its 
own ministerial exception or to bar the lawsuit as an actual violation 
of the First Amendment. Yet, at oral argument, the Court gave off an 
air of paralysis over both the underlying constitutional matter and 
how it might formulate a test for determining who is and who is not a 
minister.117 
But perhaps most compellingly, if the Court barred Perich’s claim 
at this point without first remanding to determine the actual reason 
for her termination, it would send a signal that a religious 
organization need only claim religious reasons for firing an employee 
to avoid liability under religiously neutral and generally applicable 
antidiscrimination laws. This not only offends basic notions of fairness 
but would, in effect, critically undermine the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s assurance of equal protection under the law.118 Indeed, 
at oral argument, Justice Sotomayor seized upon this problem by 
offering a hypothetical: what about a teacher who is fired by a 
religious employer for reporting sexual abuse to the government?119 
Counsel for Hosanna-Tabor reluctantly responded that should a case 
like that arise, it would be appropriate for the Court to carve out a 
 
 115.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 22 (Alito, J.) (“Mr. Laycock, 
doesn’t this inquiry illustrate the problems that will necessarily occur if you get into a pretext 
analysis?”). 
 116.  See supra statements by Justices in notes 103, 104, 105. 
 117.  See generally id. 
 118.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(explaining that pretextual analysis “protects against the invasion of constitutional rights 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights”); 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“[C]hurches are not—and should not be—above the law.”). 
 119.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 5. 
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child-abuse reporting exception to the ministerial exception.120 In 
doing so, counsel all but conceded the point: not even Hosanna-Tabor 
would want to live in the world it seeks to create. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court is likely to affirm the Sixth 
Circuit, remanding the case to the trial court and allowing Perich’s 
claim to proceed on the merits with the careful instructions of the 
Sixth Circuit. 
 
 
 120.  Id. at 6. 
